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Abstract
We show an essentially tight bound on the number of adaptively chosen statistical
queries that a computationally efficient algorithm can answer accurately given n samples
from an unknown distribution. A statistical query asks for the expectation of a predi-
cate over the underlying distribution, and an answer to a statistical query is accurate if
it is “close” to the correct expectation over the distribution. This question was recently
studied by Dwork et al. [DFH+15], who showed how to answer Ω˜(n2) queries efficiently, and
also by Hardt and Ullman [HU14], who showed that answering O˜(n3) queries is hard. We
close the gap between the two bounds and show that, under a standard hardness
assumption, there is no computationally efficient algorithm that, given n samples from an
unknown distribution, can give valid answers toO(n2) adaptively chosen statistical queries.
An implication of our results is that computationally efficient algorithms for answering
arbitrary, adaptively chosen statistical queries may as well be differentially private.
We obtain our results using a new connection between the problem of answering adap-
tively chosen statistical queries and a combinatorial object called an interactive fingerprint-
ing code [FT01]. In order to optimize our hardness result, we give a new Fourier-analytic
approach to analyzing fingerprinting codes that is simpler, more flexible, and yields better
parameters than previous constructions.
∗Harvard University School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. Supported by NSF grant CCF-1116616.
Email: tsteinke@seas.harvard.edu.
†Harvard University Center for Research on Computation and Society and Columbia University. Supported by
NSF Grant CNS-1237235 and a Simons Society of Fellows Junior Fellowship. Email: jullman@cs.columbia.edu.
ar
X
iv
:1
41
0.
12
28
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
0 F
eb
 20
15
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Applications to Data Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Additional Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Interactive Fingerprinting Codes 5
2.1 Definition and Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 The Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Analysis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1 Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3 Establishing Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Proof of Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Proof of Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.1 Biased Fourier Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.3 Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.4 Bounding the Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Non-Interactive Fingerprinting Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Hardness of False Discovery 24
3.1 The Statistical Query Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Encryption Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 The Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4 Informal Analysis of the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.5 Analysis of the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.6 An Information-Theoretic Lower Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4 Hardness of Avoiding Blatant Non Privacy 30
4.1 Blatant Non Privacy and Sample Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 Lower Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 An Information-Theoretic Lower Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Acknowledgements 35
References 35
A Security Reductions from Sections 3 and 4 37
1 Introduction
Empirical research commonly involves asking multiple “queries” on a finite sample drawn
from some population(e.g., summary statistics, hypothesis tests, or learning algorithms). The
outcome of a query is deemed significant if it is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone,
and a “false discovery” occurs if the analyst incorrectly declares an observation significant. For
decades statisticians have been devising methods for preventing false discovery, such as the
“Bonferroni correction” [Bon36, Dun61] and the widely used and highly influential method of
Benjamini and Hochberg [BH95] for controlling the “false discovery rate.”
Nevertheless, false discovery persists across all empirical sciences, and both popular and
scientific articles report on an increasing number of invalid research findings. Typically false
discovery is attributed to misuse of statistics. However, another possible explanation is that
methods for preventing false discovery do not address the fact that data analysis is inherently
adaptive—the choice of queries depends on previous interactions with the data. The issue of
adaptivity was recently investigated in a striking paper by Dwork, Feldman, Hardt, Pitassi,
Reingold, and Roth [DFH+15] and also by [HU14].
These two papers formalized the problem of adaptive data analysis in Kearns’ statistical-
query (SQ) model [Kea93]. In the SQ model, there is an algorithm called the oracle that is given
n samples from an unknown distribution D over some finite universe X = {0,1}d , where the
parameter d is the dimensionality of the distribution. The oracle must answer statistical queries
about D. A statistical query q is specified by a predicate p : X → {0,1} and the answer to a
statistical query is
q(D) = E
x∼D [p(x)] .
The oracle’s answer a to a query q is accurate if |a − q(D)| ≤ α with high probability (for
suitably small α). Importantly, the goal of the oracle is to provide answers that “generalize” to
the underlying distribution, rather than answers that are specific to the sample. The latter is
easy to achieve by outputting the empirical average of the query predicate on the sample.
The analyst makes a sequence of queries q1,q2, . . . , qk to the oracle, which responds with
answers a1, a2, . . . , ak . In the adaptive setting, the query qi may depend on the previous queries
and answers q1, a1, . . . , qi−1, ai−1 arbitrarily. We say the oracle is accurate given n samples for k
adaptively chosen queries if, when given n samples from an arbitrary distributionD, the oracle
accurately responds to any adaptive analyst that makes at most k queries with high probability.
A computationally efficient oracle answers each query in time polynomial in n and d.1
When the queries are specified non adaptively (i.e. independent of previous answers), then
the empirical average of each query on the sample is accurate with high probability as long
as k ≤ 2o(n). However, the situation turns out to be very different when the queries are asked
adaptively. Using a connection to differential privacy [DMNS06], Dwork et al. [DFH+15] showed
that there is a computationally efficient oracle that accurately answers Ω˜(n2) many adaptively
chosen queries. They also showed that there is an exponential-time oracle that can answer
exponentially in n many queries, and left it open whether this guarantee could be achieved
by an efficient oracle. Unfortunately, [HU14], building on hardness results for differential pri-
vacy [Ull13, BUV14] showed that, assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is no
computationally efficient algorithm that answers O˜(n3) queries. Given the importance of pre-
venting false discovery in adaptive data analysis, we would like to know if there is an efficient
algorithm that answers as many as n3 queries.
1We assume that the analyst only asks queries that can be evaluated on the sample in polynomial time.
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Unfortunately, we show that this is not the case, and prove the following nearly optimal
hardness result for preventing false discovery.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is no computationally
efficient oracle that given n samples is accurate on O(n2) adaptively chosen queries.
Conceptually, our result gives further evidence that there may be an inherent computa-
tional barrier to preventing false discovery in interactive data analysis. It also shows that in
the worst case, an efficient oracle for answering adaptively chosen statistical queries may as
well be differentially private. That is, the oracle used in Dwork et al. [DFH+15] to answer
Ω˜(n2) queries gives the strong guarantee of differential privacy for the sample, and no efficient
oracle regardless of privacy can answer significantly more arbitrary, adaptively chosen queries.
It would be interesting to see whether this sort of equivalence holds in more restricted settings.
As in [HU14], our hardness result applies whenever the dimensionality d of the data grows
with the sample size such that 2d is not polynomial in n.2 This requirement is both mild and
necessary. If n 2d then the empirical distribution of the n samples will be close to the under-
lying distribution in statistical distance, so every statistical query can be answered accurately
given the sample. Thus, the dimensionality of the data has a major effect on the hardness of
the problem. In fact, we can prove a nearly optimal information theoretic lower bound when the
dimensionality of the data is much larger than n.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There is no oracle (even a computationally unbounded one) that given n
samples in dimension d =O(n2) is accurate on O(n2) adaptively chosen queries.
Our result builds on the techniques of [HU14], who use fingerprinting code [BS98, Tar08]
to prove their hardness result. In this work, we identify a variant called an interactive finger-
printing code [FT01], which abstracts the technique in [HU14] and gives a more direct way of
proving hardness results for adaptive data analysis. A slightly weaker version of our results
can be obtained using the nice recent construction of interactive fingerprinting codes due to
Laarhoven et al. [LDR+13] as a black box. However, we give a new analysis of (a close variant
of) their code, which is simpler and achieves stronger parameters.
Thus, we can summarize the contributions of this work as follows.
1. We identify interactive fingerprinting codes as the key combinatorial object underlying the
hardness of preventing false discovery in adaptive environments, analogous to the way in
which (non interactive) fingerprinting codes are the key combinatorial object underlying
the hardness of differential privacy.
2. We use this connection to prove nearly optimal hardness results for preventing false dis-
covery in interactive data analysis.
3. We give a new Fourier-analytic method for analyzing both interactive and non-interactive
fingerprinting codes that we believe is more intuitive, more flexible, and also leads to
even stronger hardness results. In particular, using our analysis we are able to prove that
these codes are optimally robust3 [BUV14], which can be used to strengthen the hardness
results in [Ull13, BUV14, SU15]. Given the importance of fingerprinting codes to adap-
tive data analysis and privacy, we believe this new analysis will find further applications.
2This is under the stronger, but still standard, assumption that exponentially-hard one-way functions exist.
3In this context, optimal robustness means that all of our hardness results apply even when the oracle answers
only a 1/2 +Ω(1) fraction of the queries accurately.
2
1.1 Techniques
The structure of our proof is rather simple, and closely follows the framework in [HU14]. We
will design a challenge distribution D and a computationally efficient adaptive analyst A who
knows D. If any computationally efficient oracle O is given n samples S = {x1, . . . ,xn} drawn
from D, then our analyst A can use the answers of O to reconstruct the set S. Using this
information, the adversary can construct a query on which S is not representative of D.
Our adversary A and the distribution D, like that of [HU14], is built from a combinatorial
object with a computational “wrapper.” The computational wrapper uses queries that crypto-
graphically “hide” information from the oracle O. In our work he combinatorial object will be
an interactive fingerprinting code (IFPC). An IFPC is a generalization of a (standard) fingerprint-
ing code, which was originally introduced by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] as a way to watermark
digital content.
An interactive fingerprinting code F is an efficient interactive algorithm that defeats any
adversary P in the following game (with high probability). The adversary P picks S ⊂ [N ]
unknown to F . The goal of F is to identify S by making ` interactive queries to P . F specifies
each query by a vector c ∈ {±1}N . In response, the adversary P must simply output a ∈ {±1}
such that a = ci for some i ∈ [N ]. However, the adversary P is restricted to only see ci for i ∈ S.
At any time, F may accuse some i ∈ [N ]. If i ∈ S is accused, then i is removed from S (i.e.
S ← S\{i}), thereby further restricting P . If i < S is accused, then this is referred to as a false
accusation. To win, the interactive fingerprinting code F must accuse all of S, without making
“too many” false accusations.
In contrast [HU14] use only standard fingerprinting codes. The difference between inter-
active and non interactives fingerprinting codes is that a non interactive fingerprinting code
must give all ` queries to P at once, but is (necessarily) only required to identify one i ∈ S. The
suboptimal parameters achieved by [HU14], as well as some of the additional technical work,
are there result of having to boost non interactive fingerprinting codes to recover all of S. Using
this new perspective of interactive fingerprinting codes, the technique of [HU14] can be seen as
a construction of an interactive fingerprinting code with length ` = O˜(N3) by concatenating N
independent copies of Tardos’ [Tar08] non interactive fingerprinting code of length ` = O˜(N2).
However, one can construct more clever and shorter interactive fingerprinting codes. Specif-
ically, Laarhoven et al. [LDR+13] (building on Tardos [Tar08]) give a construction that would be
suitable for our application with ` = O˜(N2). Extending their results, we give a new analysis of
their interactive fingerprinting code as well as Tardos’ non interactive fingerprinting code that
allows us to achieve length ` =O(N2) while still being sufficiently secure for our application.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). For everyN , there exists an interactive fingerprinting code with ` =O(N2)
that, except with negligible probability, makes at most N/1000 false accusations.
This result suffices for the informal statements made above, but our construction is some-
what more general and has additional parameters and security properties, which we detail in
Section 2.
1.2 Applications to Data Privacy
The adversary used to show hardness of preventing false discovery is effectively carrying out
a reconstruction attack against the database of samples. Roughly, if there is an adversary who
can reconstruct the set of samples S from the oracle’s answers, then the oracle is said to be
3
“blatantly non-private”—it reveals essentially all of the data it holds, and so cannot guarantee
any reasonable notion of privacy to the owners of the data. Since the seminal work of Dinur
and Nissim [DN03], such reconstruction attacks have been used to establish strong limitations
on the accuracy of privacy-preserving oracles.
Using interactive fingerprinting codes, combined with the framework of [HU14], we obtain
the following results. In both cases, [HU14] show similar results, in which our O(n2) bounds
are replaced with O˜(n3).
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). Assuming the existence of one-way functions, every computationally
efficient oracle that, given n samples, is accurate on O(n2) adaptively chosen queries is blatantly
non private.
Theorem 1.4 should be compared with the result in [Ull13], which showed that any com-
putationally efficient oracle that, given n samples, is accurate for O˜(n2) non-adaptively chosen
queries cannot satisfy the strong guarantee of “differential privacy” [DN03, DMNS06]. Theo-
rem 1.4 shows that, in the adaptive setting, we can obtain a stronger privacy violation using
fewer queries than [Ull13].
Theorem 1.5 (Informal). Every (possibly computationally unbounded) oracle that, given n samples
in dimension d =O(n2), is accurate on O(n2) adaptively chosen queries is blatantly non private.
Theorem 1.5 should be compared with the result in [BUV14] that showed any (possibly
computationally unbounded) oracle that answers a fixed family of O˜(n2) simple queries in di-
mension d = O˜(n2) cannot satisfy differential privacy.
In contrast with Theorems 1.4 and 1.5, the well-known result of [DMNS06] shows that there
is an efficient differentially private algorithm that answers Ω˜(n2) adaptively chosen queries.
Our results show that, in the adaptive setting, there is a sharp threshold for the number of
queries where, below this threshold, the strong notation of differential privacy can be achieved
and, above this threshold, even minimal notions of privacy are unachievable.
1.3 Additional Related Work
Our work and [HU14] is part of a line of work connecting technology for secure watermark-
ing to lower bounds for private and interactive data analysis tasks. This connection first ap-
peared in the work of Dwork, Naor, Reingold, Rothblum, and Vadhan [DNR+09], who showed
that the existence of traitor-tracing schemes implies hardness of differential privacy. Traitor-
tracing schemes were introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [CFN94], also for the problem of
watermarking digital content. The connection between traitor-tracing and differential privacy
was strengthened in [Ull13], which introduced the use of fingerprinting codes in the context
of differential privacy, and used them to show optimal hardness results for certain settings.
[BUV14] showed that fingerprinting codes can be used to prove nearly-optimal information-
theoretic lower bounds for differential privacy, which established fingerprinting codes as the
key information-theoretic object underlying lower bounds in differential privacy.
Since there introduction by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] there has been extensive work on fin-
gerprinting codes, most of which is beyond the scope of this discussion. For the standard, non-
interactive definition of fingerprinting codes, [Tar08] gave an essentially optimal construction,
which has been very influential in most of the subsequent work on the topic. The interactive
model of fingerprinting codes was first studied by [FT01] under the name “dynamic traitor-
tracing schemes.” Formally their results are in a significantly different model and cannot be
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used to prove hardness of preventing false discovery. [Tas05] gave the first construction in the
model we use, but achieved suboptimal code length. Recently Laarhoven, Doumen, Roelse,
Sˇkoric´, and de Wegner [LDR+13], gave a construction with nearly optimal length by generaliz-
ing Tardos’ code to the interactive setting. Their construction is quite similar to ours, but our
analysis is substantively different and leads to sharper and more general guarantees (and we
feel is more intuitive).
In an exciting recent paper, [DFH+15] gave the first algorithms for answering arbitrary
adaptively chosen statistical queries. Their algorithms rely on known algorithms for answering
statistical queries under differential privacy in a black box manner. Recently, [Ull14] showed
how to design differentially private mechanisms for answering exponentially many adaptively
chosen queries from the richer class of convex empirical risk minimization queries. By the results
of [DFH+15], this algorithm is also a (computationally inefficient) oracle that is accurate for
exponentially many adaptively chosen convex empirical risk minimization queries.
1.4 Organization
In Section 2 we define and construct interactive fingerprinting codes, the main technical ingre-
dient we use to establish our results. In Sections 3 and 4 we show how interactive fingerprinting
codes can be used to obtain hardness results for preventing false discovery and blatant non pri-
vacy, respectively. The definition of interactive fingerprinting codes is contained in Section 2.1
and is necessary for Sections 3 and 4, but the remainder of Section 2 and Sections 3 and 4 can
be read in either order.
2 Interactive Fingerprinting Codes
In order to motivate the definition of interactive fingerprinting codes, it will be helpful to
review the motivation for standard, non interactive fingerprinting codes.
Fingerprinting codes were introduced by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] for the problem of wa-
termarking digital content (such as a movie or a piece of software). Consider a company that
distributes some content to N users. Some of the users may illegally distribute copies of the
content. To combat this, the company gives each user a unique version of the content by adding
distinctive “watermarks” to it. Thus, if the company finds an illegal copy, it can be traced back
to the user who originally purchased it. Unfortunately, users may be able to remove the wa-
termarks. In particular, a coalition of users may combine their copies in a way that mixes or
obfuscates the watermarks. A fingerprinting code ensures that, even if up to n users collude to
combine their codewords, an illegal copy can be still be traced to at least one of the users.
Formally, every user i ∈ [N ] is given a codeword (c1i , c2i , . . . , c`i ) ∈ {±1}` by the fingerprinting
code, which represents the combination of watermarks in that user’s copy. A subset S ⊂ [N ]
of at most n users can arbitrarily combine their codewords to create a “pirate codeword” a =
(a1, a2, . . . , a`) ∈ {±1}`. The only constraint is so-called consistency—for every j ∈ [`], if, for every
colluding user i ∈ S, we have cji = b, then aj = b. That is to say, if each of the colluding users
receives the same watermark, then their combined codeword must also have that watermark.
Given a, the fingerprinting code must be able to trace at least one user i ∈ S. Tardos [Tar08]
constructed optimal fingerprinting codes with ` =O(n2 logN ).
A key drawback of fingerprinting codes is that we can only guarantee that a single user
i ∈ S is traced. This is inherent, as setting the pirate codeword a to be the codeword of a single
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user prevents any other user from being identified. We will see that this can be circumvented
by moving to an interactive setting.
Suppose the company is instead distributing a stream of content (such as a TV series) to
N users—that is, the content is not distributed all at once and the illegal copies are obtained
whilst the content is being distributed (e.g. the episodes of the TV series appear on the internet
before the next episode is shown). Again, the content is watermarked so that each user receives
a unique stream and a subset S ⊂ [N ] of at most n users combine their streams and distribute an
illegal stream. The company obtains the illegal stream and uses this to trace the colluding users
S. As soon as the company can identify a colluding user i ∈ S, that user’s stream is terminated
(e.g. their subscription is cancelled). This process continues until every i ∈ S has been traced
and the distribution of illegal copies ceases.
Another twist on fingerprinting codes is robustness [BUV14]. Suppose that the consistency
constraint only holds for (1 − β)` choices of j ∈ [`]. That is to say, the colluding users can
somehow remove a β fraction of the watermarks. [BUV14] showed how to modify the Tardos
fingerprinting code to be robust to a small constant fraction of inconsistencies. In this work,
we show that robustness to any β < 1/2 fraction of inconsistencies can be achieved.
2.1 Definition and Existence
We are now ready to formally define interactive fingerprinting codes. To do so we make use of
the following game between an adversary P and the fingerprinting code F . Both P and F may
be stateful. For a given execution of F , we let C ∈ {±1}N×` be the matrix with columns c1, . . . , c`
P selects a subset of users S1 ⊆ [N ] of size n, unknown to F .
For j = 1, . . . , `:
F outputs a column vector cj ∈ {±1}N .
Let cj
Sj
∈ {±1}|Sj | be the restriction of cj to coordinates in Sj , which is given to P .
P outputs aj ∈ {±1}, which is given to F .
F accuses a (possibly empty) set of users I j ⊆ [N ]. Let Sj+1 = Sj \ I j .
Figure 1: IFPCN,n,`[P ,F ]
and let a ∈ {±1}` be the vector with entries a1, . . . , a`. We want to construct the fingerprinting
code so that, if a is consistent, then the tracer succeeds in recovering every user in S. For
convenience, we will define the notation θj to be the number of rounds 1, . . . , j in which aj is
not consistent with cj . Formally, for a given execution of F ,
θj =
∣∣∣∣{1 ≤ k ≤ j ∣∣∣ @ i ∈ [N ], ak = cki }∣∣∣∣ .
Using this notation, a is β-consistent if θ` ≤ β`. We also define the notation ψj to be the number
of users in I1, . . . , I j who are falsely accused (i.e. not in the coalition S1). Formally,
ψj =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ⋃
1≤k≤j
Ik
 \ S1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Using this notation, we require ψ` ≤ δ(N − |S1|) - that is, the tracing algorithm does not make
too many false accusations. “Too many” is defined as more than a δ-fraction of innocent users.
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Definition 2.1 (Interactive Fingerprinting Codes). We say that an algorithm F is an n-collusion-
resilient interactive fingerprinting code of length ` for N users robust to a β fraction of errors with
failure probability ε and false accusation probability δ if for every adversary P , it holds that
P
IFPCN,n,`[P ,F ]
[(
θ` ≤ β`
)
∨
(
ψ` > δ(N −n)
)]
≤ ε
The length ` may depend on N,n,β,ε,δ.
The constraint ψ` ≤ δN is called soundness—the interactive fingerprinting code should not
make (many) false accusations. The constraint θ` > β` is called completeness—the interactive
fingerprinting code should force the adversary P to be inconsistent. Although it may seem
strange that we make no reference to recovering the coalition S1, notice that if Sj , ∅, then P
can easily be consistent. Therefore, if the pirate cannot be consistent, it must be the case that
Sj = ∅ for some j, meaning all of S1 has been accused.
In the remainder of this section, we give a construction of interactive fingerprinting codes,
and establish the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Existence of Interactive Fingerprinting Codes). For every 1 ≤ n ≤ N , 0 ≤ β < 1/2,
and 0 < δ ≤ 1, there is a n-collusion-resilient interactive fingerprinting code of length ` for N users
robust to a β fraction of errors with failure probability
ε ≤min{δ(N −n),2−Ω(δ(N−n))}+ δΩ(( 12−β)n)
and false accusation probability δ for
` =O
n2 log(1/δ)(1
2 − β
)4
 .
We remark on the parameters of our construction and how they relate to the literature.
Remark 2.3.
• The expression for the failure probability ε is a bit mysterious. To interpret it, we fix β =
1/2−Ω(1) and consider two parameter regimes: δ(N −n) 1 and δ(N −n) 1.
In the traditional parameter regime for fingerprinting codes δ(N −n) = ε′  1, and so no users
are falsely accused. Then our fingerprinting code has length O(n2 log((N −n)/ε′)) and a failure
probability of ε′. This matches the result of [LDR+13].
However, if we are willing to tolerate falsely accusing a small constant fraction of users, then we
can set, for example, δ(N −n) = .01N , and our fingerprinting code will have length O(n2) and
failure probability 2−Ω(n). To our knowledge, such large values of δ have not been considered
before. It saves a logarithmic factor in our final result.
• Our construction works for any robustness parameter β < 1/2. Previously [BUV14] gave a
construction for β = 1/75 in the non-interactive setting. Previous constructions in the inter-
active setting do not achieve any robustness β > 0, even for the weaker model of robustness to
erasures [BN08].
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• Our completeness condition differs subtly from previous work. We require that, with high
probability,
θ` =
∣∣∣∣{1 ≤ k ≤ ` ∣∣∣ @ i ∈ [N ], ak = cki }∣∣∣∣ > β`,
rather than the weaker condition∣∣∣∣{1 ≤ k ≤ ` ∣∣∣ @ i ∈ S1, ak = cki }∣∣∣∣ > β`.
While our version is less natural in the watermarking setting, it is important to our application
to false dicsovery. Our interactive fingerprinting code ensures that the adversary cannot be
consistent with respect to the population, rather than that it cannot be consistent with respect
to the sample.
2.2 The Construction
Our construction and analysis is based on the optimal (non interactive) fingerprinting codes of
Tardos [Tar08], and the robust variant by Bun et al. [BUV14]. The code is essentially the same,
but columns are generated and shown to the adversary one at a time, and tracing is modified
to identify users interactively.
We begin with some definitions and notation. For 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, let Da,b be the distribu-
tion with support (a,b) and probability density function µ(p) = Ca,b/
√
p(1− p), where Ca,b is a
normalising constant.4 For α,ζ ∈ (0,1/2), let Dα,ζ be the distribution on [0,1] that returns a
sample from Dα,1−α with probability 1− 2ζ and 0 or 1 each with probability ζ.
For p ∈ [0,1], let c ∼ p denote that c ∈ {±1} is drawn from the distribution with P [c = 1] = p
and P [c = −1] = 1− p. Let c1···n ∼ p denote that c ∈ {±1}n is drawn from a product distribution
in which ci ∼ p independently for all i ∈ [n].
Define φp : {±1} →R by φ0(c) = φ1(c) = 0 and, for p ∈ (0,1), φp(1) = √(1− p)/p and φp(−1) =
−√p/(1− p). The function φp is chosen so that φp(c) has mean 0 and variance 1 when c ∼ p.
The fingerprinting code F is defined in Figure 2. In addition to the precise setting of pa-
rameters, we have given asymptotic bounds to help follow the analysis. We now analyze F
and establish Theorem 2.2. The proof of Theorem 2.2 is split into Theorems 2.8 and 2.19. For
convenience, define I =
⋃
j∈[`] I j .
2.3 Analysis Overview
Intuitively, the quantity sji , which we call the score of user i, measures the “correlation” between
the answers (a1, · · · , aj ) of P and the i-th codeword (c1i , · · · , cji ), using a particular measure of
correlation that takes into account the choices p1, . . . ,pj . If sji ever exceeds the threshold σ ,
meaning that the answers are significantly correlated with the i-th codeword, then we accuse
user i. Thus, our goal is to show two things: Soundness, that the score of an innocent user
(i.e. i < S1) never exceeds the threshold, as the answers cannot be correlated with the unknown
i-th codeword. And completeness, that the score of every guilty user (i.e. i ∈ S1) will at some
point exceed the threshold, meaning that the answers must correlate with the i-th codeword
for every i ∈ S1.
4To sample from Da,b, first sample ϕ ∈ (sin−1(
√
a),sin−1(
√
b)) uniformly, then output sin2(ϕ) as the sample.
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Given parameters 1 ≤ n ≤N and 0 < δ,β < 1/2
Set parameters:
α =
(
1
2 − β
)
4n
≥Ω

(
1
2 − β
)
n

ζ =
3
8
+
β
4
=
1
2
− 1
4
(1
2
− β
)
σ =64 ·

6pin(
1
2 − β
)2
 ·
⌈
loge
(32
δ
)⌉
≤O
 n(1
2 − β
)2 log(1δ )

` =

6pin(
1
2 − β
)2
 · σ ≤O
 n2(1
2 − β
)4 log(1δ )

Let s0i = 0 for every i ∈ [N ].
For j = 1, . . . , `:
Draw pj ∼Dα,ζ and cj1···N ∼ pj .
Issue cj ∈ {±1}N as a challenge and receive aj ∈ {±1} as the response.
For i ∈ [N ], let sji = sj−1i + aj ·φp
j
(cji ).
Accuse I j =
{
i ∈ [N ] | sji > σ
}
.
Figure 2: The interactive fingerprinting code F = Fn,N,δ,β
2.3.1 Soundness
The proof of soundness closely mirrors Tardos’ analysis [Tar08] of the non-interactive case. If
i is innocent, then, since P doesn’t see the codeword (c1i , · · · , cji ) of the ith user, there cannot be
too much correlation. In this case, one can show that sji is the sum of j independent random
variables, each with mean 0 and variance 1, where we take the answers a1, . . . , aj as fixed and
the randomness is over the choice of the unknown codeword. By analogy to Gaussian random
variables, one would expect that sji ≤ σ =Θ(
√
` log(1/δ)) with probability at least 1−δ. Formally,
the fact that the score in each round is not bounded prevents the use of a Chernoff bound. But
nonetheless, in Section 2.4, we prove soundness using a Chernoff-like tail bound for sji .
2.3.2 Completeness
To prove completeness, we must show that, for guilty users i ∈ S1, we have sji > σ for some
j ∈ [`] with high probability. In Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.3, we prove that if P gives consistent
answers in a 1− β fraction of rounds, then the sum of the scores for each of the guilty users is
large. Specifically, in Theorem 2.17, we prove that with high probability∑
i∈S1
s`i ≥Θ (`) (1)
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The constants hidden by the asymptotic notation are set to imply that, for at least one i ∈ S1,
the score s`i is above the threshold σ = Θ (`/n). This step is not too different from the analysis
of Tardos and Bun et al. [Tar08, BUV14] for the non-interactive case. To show that, for every
i ∈ S1, we will have sji > σ at some point, we must depart from the analysis of non-interactive
fingerprinting codes. If sji > σ , and user i is accused in round j, then the adversary will not see
the suffix of codeword (cj+1i , · · · , c`i ). By the same argument that was used to prove soundness,
the answers will not be correlated with this suffix, so with high probability the score s`i does
not increase much beyond σ . Thus,∑
i∈S1
s`i ≤ n ·O(σ ) =Θ (`) . (2)
The hidden constants are set to ensure that Equation (2) conflicts with Equation (1). Thus,
we can conclude that P cannot give consistent answers for a 1 − β fraction of rounds. That is
to say, P is forced to be inconsistent because all of S1 is accused and eventually P sees none of
the codewords and is reduced to guessing an answer aj .
2.3.3 Establishing Correlation
Proving Equation (1) is key to the analysis. Our proof thereof combines and simplifies the
analyses of [Tar08] and [BUV14]. For this high level overview, we ignore the issue of robustness
and fix β = 0.
First we prove that the correlation bound holds in expectation and then we show that it
holds with high probability using an Azuma-like concentration bound. (Again, as the random
variables being summed are not bounded, we are forced to use a more tailored analysis to prove
concentration.) We show that it holds in expectation for each round. In Proposition 2.14, we
show that the concentration grows in expectation in each round. For every j ∈ [`],
E
∑
i∈S1
s
j
i − sj−1i
 = E
∑
i∈S1
aj ·φpj (cji )
 ≥Ω(1), (3)
where the expectations are taken over the randomness of pj , cj , and aj . Equation (3), combined
with a concentration result, implies Equation (1).
The intuition behind Equation (3) and the choice of pj is as follows. Consistency guarantees
that, if cji = b for all i ∈ S1, then aj = b. This is a weak correlation guarantee, but it suffices to
ensure correlation between aj and
∑
i∈S1 c
j
i . The affine scaling φ
pj ensures that φp
j
(cji ) has mean
zero (i.e. is uncorrelated with a constant) and and unit variance (i.e. has unit correlation with
itself). The expectation of aj ·φpj (cji ) can be interpreted as the i-th first-order Fourier coefficient
of aj as a function of cj . To understand first-order Fourier coefficients, consider the “dictator”
function: Suppose aj = cji∗ for some i
∗ ∈ S1 - that is, P always outputs the i∗-th bit. Then
E
aj ,cj ,pj
aj ∑
i∈S1
φp
j
(cji )
 = Ecj ,pj
[
c
j
i∗ ·φp
j
(cji∗)
]
= E
pj
[
2
√
pj(1− pj )
]
=Θ(1).
This example can be generalised to aj being an arbitrary function of cjS1 using Fourier analysis.
This calculation also indicates why we choose the probability density function of pj ∼ Dα,1−α
to be proportional to 1/
√
p(1− p).
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To handle robustness (β > 0) we use the ideas of [BUV14]. With probability 2ζ each round is
a “special” constant round—i.e. cj = (1)N or cj = (−1)N . Otherwise it is a “normal” round where
cj is sampled as before. Intuitively, the adversary P cannot distinguish the special rounds
from the normal rounds in which c happens to be constant. If the adversary gives inconsistent
answers on normal rounds, then it must also give inconsistent answers on special rounds. Since
there are many more special rounds than normal rounds, this means that a small number of
inconsistencies in normal rounds implies a large number of inconsistencies on special rounds.
Conversely, inconsistencies are absorbed by the special rounds, so we can assume there are very
few inconsistencies in normal rounds. Thus P is forced to behave consistently on the normal
rounds and the analysis on these rounds proceeds as before.
2.4 Proof of Soundness
We first show that no user is falsely accused except with probability δ/2. This boils down
to proving a concentration bound. Then another concentration bound shows that with high
probability at most a δ fraction of users are falsely accused.
These concentrations bounds are essentially standard. However, we are showing concen-
tration of sums of variables of the form φp(c), which may be quite large if p ≈ 0 or p ≈ 1.
This technical problem prevents us from directly applying standard concentration bounds. In-
stead we open up the standard proofs and verify the desired concentration. We take the usual
approach of bounding the moment generating function and using that to give a tail bound.
Lemma 2.4. For p ∈ [α,1−α]∪ {0,1} and t ∈ [−√α/2,√α/2], we have
E
c∼p
[
etφ
p(c)
]
≤ et2 .
Proof. If p ∈ {0,1}, φp = 0 and the result is trivial. We have E
c∼p [φ
p(c)] = 0, E
c∼p
[
φp(c)2
]
= 1,
and, for c ∈ {±1}, |φp(c)| ≤ 1/√α. In particular, |φp(c) · t| ≤ 1/2. For u ∈ [−1/2,1/2], we have
eu ≤ 1 +u +u2. Thus
E
c∼p
[
etφ
p(c)
]
≤ 1 + t E
c∼p [φ
p(c)] + t2 E
c∼p
[
φp(c)2
]
= 1 + t2 ≤ et2 .
Lemma 2.5. Let p1 · · ·pm ∈ [α,1 − α] ∪ {0,1} and c1 · · ·cm drawn independently with ci ∼ pi . Let
a1 · · ·am ∈ [−1,1] be fixed. For all λ ≥ 0, we have
P
∑
i∈[m]
aiφ
pi (ci) ≥ λ
 ≤ e−λ2/4m + e−√αλ/4.
Proof. By Lemma 2.4, for all t ∈ [−√α/2,√α/2],
E
c
[
et
∑
i∈[m] aiφpi (ci )
]
≤
∏
i∈[m]
E
ci
[
etaiφ
pi (ci )
]
≤ et2m.
By Markov’s inequality,
P
∑
i∈[m]
aiφ
pi (ci) ≥ λ
 ≤ E
[
et
∑
i∈[m] aiφpi (ci )
]
etλ
≤ et2m−tλ.
11
Set t = min{√α/2,λ/2m}. If λ ∈ [0,m√α], then
P
∑
i∈[m]
aiφ
pi (ci) ≥ λ
 ≤ e−λ2/4m.
On the other hand, if λ ≥m√α, then
P
∑
i∈[m]
aiφ
pi (ci) ≥ λ
 ≤ eαm/4−√αλ/2 ≤ e−√αλ/4.
The result is obtained by adding these expressions.
The following theorem shows how we can beat the union bound for tail bounds on partial
sums.
Theorem 2.6 (Etemadi’s Inequality [Ete85]). Let X1 · · ·Xn ∈ R be independent random variables.
For k ∈ [n], define Sk = ∑i∈[k]Xi to be the kth partial sum. Then, for all λ > 0,
P
[
max
k∈[n]
|Sk | > 4λ
]
≤ 4 ·max
k∈[n]
P [|Sk | > λ] .
Proposition 2.7 (Individual Soundness). For all i ∈ [N ], we have
P
[
i ∈ I \ S1
]
≤ 8(e−σ2/64` + e−σ
√
α/16) ≤ δ/2,
where the probability is taken over IFPCN,≤N,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β] for an arbitrary P .
Here IFPCN,≤n,` denotes IFPCN,n,` with the constraint |S1| = n replaced by the constraint
|S1| ≤ n.
Proof. Let i ∈ [N ] \ S1. Since the adversary does not see cji for any j ∈ [`], we may treat the
answers of the adversary as fixed and analyse sji as if c
j
i was drawn after the actions of the
adversary are fixed. Thus, by Lemma 2.5, for every j ∈ [`],
P
[
s
j
i >
σ
4
]
= P
∑
k∈[j]
akφp
k
(cki ) >
σ
4
 ≤ e−σ2/64` + e−σ√α/16.
Likewise P
[
s
j
i < −σ4
]
≤ e−σ2/64` + e−σ√α/16. Thus, by Theorem 2.6,
P [i ∈ I] ≤ P
[
max
j∈[`]
|sji | > σ
]
≤ 4max
j∈[`]
P
[
|sji | >
σ
4
]
≤ 8(e−σ2/64` + e−σ
√
α/16) ≤ δ
2
.
Theorem 2.8 (Soundness). We have
P
[
|I \ S1| > δ(N − |S1|)
]
≤min
{
δ(N − |S1|), e−δ(N−|S1|)/8
}
,
where the probability is taken over IFPCN,≤N,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β] for an arbiratry P .
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Remark 2.9. Interestingly, Theorem 2.8 does not require |S1| ≤ n – that is, it holds with respect to
IFPCN,≤N,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β], rather than IFPCN,n,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β]. It only requires that F does not see the
codewords of users not in S1.
This is a useful if we are in a setting where |S1| is unknown: if |S1| > n, then the interactive
fingerprinting code will still not make too many false accusations, even if it fails to identify all of S1.
Proof. Let Ei ∈ {0,1} be the indicator of the event i ∈ I\S1. The Eis for i ∈ [N ] are independent
(conditioned on the choice of S1 and pj for j ∈ [`]). Moreover, by Proposition 2.7, E [Ei] ≤ δ/2
for all i ∈ [N ]. Thus, by a Chernoff bound,
P
[
|I\S1| > δ(N − |S1|)
]
= P
 ∑
i∈[N ]\S1
Ei > δ(N − |S1|)
 ≤ e−δ(N−|S1|)/8.
If δ < 1/(N − |S1|), then this is a very poor bound. Instead we use the fact that the Eis are
discrete and Markov’s inequality, which amounts to a union bound. For δ(N −|S1|) < 1, we have
P
[
|I\S1| > δ(N − |S1|)
]
= P
[
|I\S1| ≥ 1
]
≤ E
 ∑
i∈[N ]\S1
Ei
 ≤ δ(N − |S1|)2 ≤ δ(N − |S1|).
The following lemma will be useful later.
Lemma 2.10. For i ∈ [N ], let ji ∈ [`+ 1] be the first j such that i < Sj , where we define S`+1 = ∅. For
any S ⊂ [N ],
P
∑
i∈S
s`i − sji−1i > λ
 ≤ e−λ2/4|S |` + e−√αλ/4,
where the probability is taken over IFPCN,≤N,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β] for an arbitrary P .
Proof. We have ∑
i∈S
s`i − sji−1i =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈[`]
I(j ≥ ji)ajφpj (cji ).
Again, since the adversary doesn’t see cji for j ≥ ji , the random variables I(j ≥ ji)aj and φp
j
(cji )
are independent, so we can view I(j ≥ ji)aj ∈ [−1,1] as fixed. Now the result follows from
Lemma 2.5.
2.5 Proof of Completeness
To show that the fingerprinting code identifies guilty users we must lower bound the scores∑
i∈S1 s`i . First we bound their expectation and then their tails.
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2.5.1 Biased Fourier Analysis
For this section, assume that the adversary P is always consistent - that is, we have no robust-
ness and β = 0. Robustness will be added in Section 2.5.2. Here we establish that the scores
have good expectation, namely
E
∑
i∈S1
s
j
i − sj−1i
 ≥Ω(1)
for all j ∈ [`]. The score s`i computes the ‘correlation’ between the bits given to user i and the
output of the adversary. We must show that that the adversary’s consistency constraint implies
that there exists some correlation on average.
In this section we deviate from the proof in [Tar08]. We use biased Fourier analysis to give
a more intuitive proof of the correlation bound.
We have the following lemma and proposition, which relate the correlation aj ·∑i∈S1φpj (cji )
to the properties of aj as a function of pj . To interpret these imagine that f represents the
adversary P with one round viewed in isolation – the fingerprinting code gives the adversary
cj and the adversary responds with f (cj
Sj
).
Firstly, the following lemma gives an interpretation of the correlation value for a fixed pj .
Lemma 2.11. Let f : {±1}n→R. Define g : [0,1]→R by g(p) = E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)]. For any p ∈ (0,1),
E
c1···n∼p
f (c) ·∑
i∈[n]
φp(ci)
 = g ′(p)√p(1− p).
Proof. For p ∈ (0,1) and s ⊂ [n], define φps : {±1}n→ R by φps (c) = ∏i∈sφp(ci). The functions φps
form an orthonormal basis with respect to the product distribution with bias p – that is,
∀s, t ⊂ [n] E
c1···n∼p
[
φ
p
s (c) ·φpt (c)
]
=
{
1 s = t
0 s , t
}
.
Thus, for any p ∈ (0,1), we can write f in terms of these basis functions:
∀c ∈ {±1}n f (c) =
∑
s⊂[n]
f˜ p(s)φps (c),
where
∀s ⊂ [n] f˜ p(s) = E
c1···n∼p
[
f (c)φps (c)
]
.
This decomposition is a generalisation of Fourier analysis to biased distributions [O’D14, §8.4].
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For p,q ∈ (0,1), the expansion of f gives the following expressions for g(q), g ′(q) and g ′(p).
g(q) = E
c1···n∼q
[f (c)]
=
∑
s⊂[n]
f˜ p(s) E
c1···n∼q
[
φ
p
s (c)
]
=
∑
s⊂[n]
f˜ p(s)
∏
i∈s
E
c∼q [φ
p(c)]
=
∑
s⊂[n]
f˜ p(s)
(
q
√
1− p
p
− (1− q)
√
p
1− p
)|s|
.
g ′(q) =
∑
s⊂[n]:s,∅
f˜ p(s) · |s| ·
(
q
√
1− p
p
− (1− q)
√
p
1− p
)|s|−1
·
(√
1− p
p
+
√
p
1− p
)
.
g ′(p) =
∑
s⊂[n]:s,∅
f˜ p(s) · |s| · 0|s|−1 ·
(√
1− p
p
+
√
p
1− p
)
=
∑
i∈[n]
f˜ p({i}) ·
(√
1− p
p
+
√
p
1− p
)
.
Note that f˜ p({i}) = E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)φp(ci)] and, hence,
E
c1···n∼p
f (c) ·∑
i∈[n]
φp(ci)
 = ∑
i∈[n]
f˜ p({i}) = g
′(p)√
1−p
p +
√
p
1−p
= g ′(p)
√
p(1− p).
Now we can interpret the correlation for a random pj ∼Da,b.
Proposition 2.12. Let f : {±1}n→ R. Define g : [0,1]→ R by g(p) = E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)]. For any 0 ≤ a <
b ≤ 1,
E
p∼Da,b
 Ec1···n∼p
f (c) ·∑
i∈[n]
φp(ci)

 = g(b)− g(a)2sin−1(√b)− 2sin−1(√a) ≥ g(b)− g(a)pi .
This effectively follows by integrating Lemma 2.11.
Proof. Let µ(p) = Ca,b/
√
p(1− p) be the probability density function for the distribution Da,b on
the interval (a,b). By Lemma 2.11 and the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have
E
p∼Da,b
 Ec1···n∼p
f (c) ·∑
i∈[n]
φp(ci)

 = Ep∼Da,b [g ′(p)√p(1− p)]
=
∫ b
a
g ′(p)
√
p(1− p)µ(p)dp
=Ca,b
∫ b
a
g ′(p)dp
=Ca,b · (g(b)− g(a)).
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It remains to show that Ca,b =
(
2sin−1(
√
b)− 2sin−1(√a)
)−1 ≥ 1/pi. This follows from observing
that
C−1a,b =
∫ b
a
1√
p(1− p)dp =
∫ b
a
(
d
dp
2sin−1(√p)
)
dp = 2sin−1(
√
b)− 2sin−1(√a)
and
C−1a,b ≤ C−10,1 = 2sin−1(1)− 2sin−1(0) = pi.
Now we have a lemma to bring consistency into the picture. If f is consistent, b ≈ 1, and
a ≈ 0, then
g(b)− g(a) ≈ g(1)− g(0) = f ((1)n)− f ((−1)n) = 1− (−1) = 2.
This gives a lower bound on the correlation for consistent f .
Lemma 2.13. Let f : {±1}n → {±1}. Define g : [0,1] → [−1,1] by g(p) = E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)]. Suppose
α ∈ [0,1]. Then |g(1−α)− g(1)| ≤ 2nα and |g(α)− g(0)| ≤ 2nα.
Proof. We have P
c1···n∼1−α
[X = (1)n] = (1−α)n and
g(1−α)− g(1) =f ((1)n) · P
c1···n∼1−α
[c = (1)n] + E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)|c , (1)n] · P
c1···n∼1−α
[c , (1)n]− g(1)
=g(1) · (1−α)n + E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)|c , (1)n] · (1− (1−α)n)− g(1)
=
(
g(1)− E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)|c , (1)n]
)
· ((1−α)n − 1) .
Now
∣∣∣∣∣g(1)− Ec1···n∼p [f (c)|c , (1)n]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 and |(1−α)n − 1| ≤ nα, whence |g(1−α)− g(1)| ≤ 2nα. The
other half of the lemma is symmetric.
2.5.2 Robustness
We require the fingerprinting code to be robust to inconsistent answers. We show that the
correlation is still good in the presence of inconsistencies.
For f : {±1}n→ {±1}, define a random variable ξα,ζ(f ) by
ξα,ζ(f ) = f (c) ·
∑
i∈[n]
φp(ci) +γI (p ∈ {0,1} ∧ f (c) , 2p − 1) , p ∼Dα,ζ , c1···n ∼ p,
where I is the indicator function and γ ∈ (0,1/2) satisfies ζγ/2 = (1− 2ζ)/pi - that is,
γ :=
2
pi
1− 2ζ
ζ
.
The first term f (c) ·∑i∈[n]φp(ci) measures the correlation as before. The second term
γI (p ∈ {0,1} ∧ f (c) , 2p − 1) measures inconsistencies. We will lower bound the expectation of
ξα,ζ(f ), which amounts to saying “either there is good correlation or there is an inconsistency
with good probability.” Thus either the fingerprinting code is able to accuse users or the adver-
sary is forced to be inconsistent.
The following bounds the expected increase in scores from one round of interaction.
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Proposition 2.14. Let f : {±1}n→ {±1} and α,ζ ∈ (0,1/2). Then
E
[
ξα,ζ(f )
]
≥ 2
pi
(1− 2ζ)(1− 2nα).
Proof. Define g : [0,1]→ [−1,1] by g(p) = E
c1···n∼p
[f (c)]. Now
E
[
ξα,ζ(f )
]
= P
p∼Dα,ζ
[p = 0] ·γI(f ((−1)n) = 1) + P
p∼Dα,ζ
[p = 1] ·γI(f ((1)n) = −1)
+ P
p∼Dα,ζ
[p ∈ [α,1−α]] · E
p∼Dα,1−α
 Ec1···n∼p
f (c) ·∑
i∈[n]
φp(ci)


=ζ ·γ (I(g(0) = 1) + I(g(1) = −1))
(by Proposition 2.12) + (1− 2ζ) · g(1−α)− g(α)
2sin−1(
√
1−α)− 2sin−1(√α)
≥ζ ·γ
(
1 + g(0)
2
+
1− g(1)
2
)
+ (1− 2ζ) · g(1−α)− g(α)
pi
=
1− 2ζ
pi
(1 + g(0) + 1− g(1) + g(1−α)− g(α))
≥1− 2ζ
pi
(2− |g(α)− g(0)| − |g(1−α)− g(1)|)
(by Lemma 2.13) ≥1− 2ζ
pi
(2− 4nα).
2.5.3 Concentration
So far we have shown that the fingerprinting code achieves good correlation or the adversary
is not consistent in expectation. However, we need this to hold with high probability. Thus we
now show that sums of ξα,ζ(f ) variables concentrate around their expectation.
Again, the proofs in this section are standard. However, the ξα,ζ(f ) variables can be quite
unwieldy and we are thus unable to apply standard results directly. So instead we must open
the proofs and verify that the concentration bounds hold. We proceed by bounding the moment
generating function of ξα,ζ(f ) and then proving an Azuma-like concentration inequality. These
calculations are not novel or insightful.
Proposition 2.15. Let f : {±1}n→ {±1}, α ∈ (0,1/2), ζ ∈ [1/4,1/2), and t ∈ [−√α/8,√α/8]. Then
E
[
e
t(ξα,ζ(f )−E[ξα,ζ(f )])] ≤ eCt2 ,
where C = 64e
nα/4
α .
Proof. We have
ξα,ζ(f ) = f (c) ·
∑
i∈[n]
φp(ci) +γI (p ∈ {0,1} ∧ f (c) , 2p − 1) , p ∼Dα,ζ , c1···n ∼ p.
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Let Y =
∑
i∈[n]φp(ci). By Lemma 2.4 and independence,
E
[
etY
]
= E
c1···n∼p
[
et
∑
i∈[n]φp(ci )
]
=
(
E
c∼p
[
etφ
p(c)
])n
≤ et2n
for t ∈ [−√α/2,√α/2]. Pick t ∈ {±√α/2} such that
∞∑
k=0
t2k+1
(2k + 1)!
E
[
Y 2k+1
]
≥ 0.
Then by dropping positive terms, for all j ≥ 1,
0 ≤ E
[
Y 2j
]
≤ (2j)!
t2j
∞∑
k=0
tk
k!
E
[
Y k
]
=
(2j)!
t2j
E
[
etY
]
≤ (2j)!
t2j
ent
2
=
4j(2j)!
αj
enα/4.
Thus we have bounded the even moments of Y . By Cauchy-Schwartz, for k = 2j + 1 ≥ 3,
E
[
|Y |k
]
≤
√
E
[
Y 2j
]
·E
[
Y 2j+2
]
≤
√
4j(2j)!
αj
enα/4 · 4
j+1(2j + 2)!
αj+1
enα/4 =
2kk!
αk/2
enα/4
√
k + 1
k
.
Since |f (c)| ≤ 1, we have E
[
|f (c) ·Y |k
]
≤ E
[
|Y |k
]
≤ 2k+1k!enα/4/αk/2 for all k ≥ 2. Since ζ ∈
[1/4,1/2), we have γ = (2/pi)(1 − 2ζ)/ζ ∈ (0,1). Hence E
[
|γI (p ∈ {0,1} ∧ f (c) , 2p − 1) |k
]
≤ 1 for
all k. The map u 7→ |u|k is convex for all k ≥ 2, thus |(x + y)/2|k ≤ (|x|k + |y|k)/2 for all k ≥ 2 and
x,y ∈R. Combining these three facts, we have
E
[
|ξα,ζ(f )|k
]
≤ 2k−1E
[
|f (c) ·Y |k + |γI(f (c) , f ∗(c))|k
]
≤ 2
2kk!enα/4
αk/2
+ 2k−1 ≤ 2
2k+1k!enα/4
αk/2
.
For t ∈ [−√α/8,√α/8], we have
E
[
etξα,ζ(f )
]
≤1 + tE
[
ξα,ζ(f )
]
+
∞∑
k=2
|t|k
k!
E
[
|ξα,ζ(f )|k
]
≤1 + tE
[
ξα,ζ(f )
]
+
∞∑
k=2
|t|k
k!
22k+1k!enα/4
αk/2
=1 + tE
[
ξα,ζ(f )
]
+ 2enα/4
∞∑
k=2
(
4|t|√
α
)k
≤1 + tE
[
ξα,ζ(f )
]
+ 2enα/4
∞∑
k=2
(
4|t|√
α
)2
2−(k−2)
=1 + tE
[
ξα,ζ(f )
]
+
64enα/4
α
t2
≤etE[ξα,ζ(f )]+Ct2
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Theorem 2.16 (Azuma-Doob Inequality). Let X1 · · ·Xm ∈ R, µ1 · · ·µmR and U0 · · ·Um ∈Ω be ran-
dom variables such that, for all i ∈ [m],
• Xi is determined by Ui ,
• µi is determined by Ui−1, and
• Ui−1 is determined by Ui .
Suppose that, for all i ∈ [m], u ∈Ω, and t ∈ [−c,c],
E
[
et(Xi−µi ) | Ui−1 = u
]
≤ eCt2 .
If λ ∈ [0,2Cmc], then
P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
(Xi −µi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ λ
 ≤ 2e−λ2/4Cm.
If λ ≥ 2Cmc, then
P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
(Xi −µi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ λ
 ≤ 2emCc2−cλ ≤ 2e−cλ/2.
Proof. First we show by induction on k ∈ [m] that, for all u ∈Ω and t ∈ [−c,c],
E
[
et
∑m
i=m−k+1(Xi−µi ) | Um−k = u
]
≤ ek·Ct2 .
This clearly holds for k = 1, as this is our supposition for i = m. Now suppose this holds for
some k ∈ [m− 1]. For u ∈Ω and t ∈ [−c,c], we have
E
[
et
∑m
i=m−k(Xi−µi ) | Um−(k+1) = u
]
=
∑
v∈Ω
P [Um−k = v | Um−k−1 = u]E
[
et
∑m
i=m−k(Xi−µi ) | Um−k = v
]
=
∑
v∈Ω
P [v | u]E
[
et(Xm−k−µm−k)et
∑m
i=m−k+1(Xi−µi ) | v
]
(using shorthand v ≡ Um−k = v and u ≡ Um−k−1 = u)
=
∑
v∈Ω
P [v | u]E
[
et(Xm−k−µm−k) | v
]
E
[
et
∑m
i=m−k+1(Xi−µi ) | v
]
(since Um−k = v determines Xm−k and µm−k)
≤
∑
v∈Ω
P [v | u]E
[
et(Xm−k−µm−k) | v
]
ek·Ct2
(by the induction hypothesis)
=E
[
et(Xm−k−µm−k) | u
]
ek·Ct2
≤eCt2ek·Ct2
(by our supposition for i =m− k)
=e(k+1)·Ct2 .
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Thus, for all t ∈ [−c,c], we have
E
[
et
∑m
i=1(Xi−µi )
]
≤ em·Ct2 .
By Markov’s inequality we have
P
∑
i∈[m]
(Xi −µi) ≥ λ
 ≤ E
[
et
∑
i∈[m](Xi−µi )]
etλ
≤ emCt2−tλ
and
P
∑
i∈[m]
(Xi −µi) ≤ −λ
 ≤ E
[
e−t
∑
i∈[m](Xi−µi )]
e(−t)(−λ)
≤ emCt2−tλ
for all t ∈ [0, c] and λ > 0. Set t = min{c,λ/2mC} to obtain the result.
2.5.4 Bounding the Score
Now we can finally show that the scores are large with high probability.
Theorem 2.17 (Correlation Lower Bound). At the end of IFPCN,n,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β] for arbitrary P , we
have, for any λ ∈ [0,17.5`/√α],
γθ` +
∑
i∈S1
s`i ≥
2
pi
(1− 2ζ)(1− 2nα)` −λ
with probability at least 1− 2e− λ2α280` .
Proof. Since the adversary P is computationally unbounded and arbitrary, we may assume it
is deterministic. We may also assume n = |S1| and that the adversary is able to see cjS1 at each
round. (This only gives the adversary more power.)
This means that for each j ∈ [`] we can define a function f j : {±1}n→ {±1} that only depends
on the interaction up to round j − 1 (i.e. is a function of the state of P before it receives cj ) and
satisfies f j(cj
Sj
) = aj . For j ∈ [`], define
Xj := γ · I
(
pj ∈ {0,1} ∧ f j(cjS1) , 2pj − 1
)
+ f j(cjS1) ·
∑
i∈S1
φp
j
(cji ) ∼ ξα,ζ(f j ),
where ∼ denotes having the same distribution. We have
γ · (θj −θj−1) +
∑
i∈S1
(sji − sj−1i ) ≤ Xj
and
γθ` +
∑
i∈S1
s`i ≤
∑
j∈[`]
Xj ∼
∑
j∈[`]
ξα,ζ(f
j ).
Now we can apply the above lemmas to bound the expectation and tail of this random variable.
Firstly, Proposition 2.14 shows that
µj := E
[
Xj
]
= E
[
ξα,ζ(f
j )
]
≥ 2
pi
(1− 2ζ)(1− 2nα)
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for all f j . Moreover, by Proposition 2.15,
E
[
et(X
j−µj )] = E[et(ξα,ζ(f j )−E[ξα,ζ(f j )])] ≤ eCt2
for all t ∈ [−√α/8,√α/8], where C = 70/α ≥ 64enα/4/α, as α ≤ 1/4n.
Define Uj = (f 1,p1, c1, · · · , f j ,pj , cj , f j+1) for j ∈ [`]∪{0}. Now X1 · · ·X`, µ1 · · ·µ`, and U0, · · · ,U`
satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 2.16 with C = 70/α, c =
√
α/8, and m = `.
For λ ∈ [0,2Cmc] = [0,17.5`/√α], we have
P
∑
j∈[`]
Xj ≤ 2pi (1− 2ζ)(1− 2nα)` −λ
 ≤ P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
(Xi −µi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ λ
 ≤ 2e−λ2/4Cm ≤ 2e− λ2α280` ,
as required.
However, we can also prove that the scores are small with high probability. This follows
from the fact that users with large scores are accused and therefore no user’s score can be too
large:
Lemma 2.18. For all λ > 0,
P
∑
i∈S1
s`i > λ+nσ +
n√
α
 ≤ e−λ2/4n` + e−√αλ/4,
where the probability is taken over IFPCN,n,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β] for an arbitrary P .
We will set λ = σ and, since 1/
√
α ≤ σ , we get that ∑i∈S1 s`i ≤ 3σn with high probability.
Proof. Let ji ∈ [`+1] be as in Lemma 2.10 – that is, i < Sji and i ∈ Sji−1, where we define S`+1 = ∅
and S0 = [N ]. By the definition of ji , sj , and Sj , we have s
ji−2
i ≤ σ for all i ∈ S1, as otherwise
i ∈ I ji−2 and therefore i < Sji−1 = Sji−2\I ji−2. If i ∈ S1, then ji = 1 and sji−1i = 0. Thus∑
i∈S1
s
ji−1
i =
∑
i∈S1
s
ji−2
i + a
ji−1φpji−1(cji−1i ) ≤
∑
i∈S1
σ +
1√
α
≤ nσ + n√
α
.
By Lemma 2.10,
P
∑
i∈S1
s`i − sji−1i > λ
 ≤ e−λ2/4n` + e−√αλ/4.
The lemma follows.
Now we show that the conflicting bounds of Theorem 2.17 and Lemma 2.18 imply com-
pleteness - that is, the adversary P cannot be consistent.
Theorem 2.19 (Completeness). At the end of IFPCN,n,`[P ,FN,n,δ,β] for an arbitrary P , we have
θ` > β` with probability at least 1− δ 12 ( 12−β)n, assuming
(
1
2 − β
)
n ≥ 1.
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Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that θ` ≤ β`. By Lemma 2.18, ∑i∈S1 s`i ≤ λ+nσ+ n√α
with probability at least 1− e−λ2/4n` − e−√αλ/4. Set λ = nσ ≥ n√
α
. Now we assume∑
i∈S1
s`i ≤ 3nσ,
which holds with probability at least 1− e−nσ2/4` − e−√αnσ/4. Then
γθ` +
∑
i∈S1
s`i ≤ γβ` + 3nσ. (4)
By Theorem 2.17, with probabilty at least 1− 2e− λ2α280` ,
γθ` +
∑
i∈S1
s`i ≥
2
pi
(1− 2ζ)(1− 2nα)` −λ (5)
for all λ ∈ [0,17.5`/√α]. Set λ =
(
1
2 − β
)2
`/2pi and assme Equation (5) also holds.
Combining Equations (4) and (5) gives
2
pi
(1− 2ζ)(1− 2nα)` −
(
1
2 − β
)2
2pi
` ≤ γβ` + 3nσ. (6)
We claim this is a contradiction, which then holds with high probability, thus proving the
theorem.
Rearranging Equation (6) gives
2
pi
(1− 2ζ)(1− 2nα) ≤
(
1
2 − β
)2
2pi
+γβ +
3nσ
`
. (7)
Our setting of parameters gives
2nα ≤
(
1
2 − β
)
2
and
3nσ
`
≤
(
1
2 − β
)2
2pi
.
Substituting these into Equation (7) gives
2
pi
(1− 2ζ)
(
1− 1
2
(1
2
− β
))
≤
(
1
2 − β
)2
pi
+γβ. (8)
Now we use 1 − 2ζ = 12
(
1
2 − β
)
and γ = 2pi
1−2ζ
ζ =
( 12−β)
piζ to derive a contradiction from Equation
(8): (
1
2 − β
)
pi
(
1− 1
2
(1
2
− β
))
≤
(
1
2 − β
)2
pi
+
(
1
2 − β
)
piζ
β,
1− 1
2
(1
2
− β
)
≤
(1
2
− β
)
+
β
ζ
,
ζ
(
1− 3
2
(1
2
− β
))
≤β.
22
Since ζ = 12 − 14
(
1
2 − β
)
, we have
ζ
(
1− 3
2
(1
2
− β
))
=
1
2
(
1− 1
2
(1
2
− β
))(
1− 3
2
(1
2
− β
))
>
1
2
(
1− 2
(1
2
− β
))
.
And
β =
1
2
(
1− 2
(1
2
− β
))
.
This gives a contradiction. The total failure probability is bounded by
e−nσ2/4` + e−
√
αnσ/4 + 2e−λ2α/280` ≤
( δ
32
)16n
+
( δ
32
)4n
+ 2
( δ
32
) 1
2 ( 12−β)n ≤ δ 12 ( 12−β)n,
assuming
(
1
2 − β
)
n ≥ 1.
2.6 Non-Interactive Fingerprinting Codes
Our construction and analysis also gives a construction of traditional non-interactive finger-
printing codes. First we give a formal definition of a fingerprinting code.
Definition 2.20 ((Non-Interactive) Fingerprinting Codes). A n-collusion resilient (non-interactive)
fingerprinting code of length ` for N users robust to a β fraction of errors with failure prob-
ability ε and false accusation probability δ is a pair of random variables C ∈ {±1}N×` and
Trace : {±1}` → 2[N ] such that the following holds. For all adversaries P : {±1}n×` → {±1}`
and S ⊂ [N ] with |S | = n,
P
C,Trace,P
[(∣∣∣∣∣{1 ≤ j ≤ ` : @i ∈ [N ] P (CS )j = cji }∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ β`)∧ (Trace(P (CS )) = ∅)] ≤ ε
and
P
C,Trace,P [|Trace(P (CS ))∩ ([N ]\S)| > δ(N −n)] ≤ ε,
where CS ∈ {±1}n×` contains the rows of C given by S.
Our construction and analysis is readily adapted to the non-interactive setting. We obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.21 (Existence of Non-Interactive Fingerprinting Codes). For every 1 ≤ n ≤ N , 0 ≤
β < 1/2, and 0 < δ ≤ 1, there is a n-collusion-resilient (non-interactive) fingerprinting code of length
` for N users robust to a β fraction of errors with failure probability
ε ≤min{δ(N −n),2−Ω(δ(N−n))}+ δΩ(( 12−β)n)
and false accusation probability δ for
` =O
n2 log(1/δ)(1
2 − β
)4
 .
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3 Hardness of False Discovery
In this section we prove our main result - that answering O(n2) adaptive queries given n sam-
ples is hard. But first we must formally define the model in which we are working.
3.1 The Statistical Query Model
Given a distribution D over {0,1}d , we would like to answer statistical queries about D. A sta-
tistical query on {0,1}d is specified by a function q : {0,1}d → [−1,1] and (abusing notation) is
defined to be
q(D) = E
x←RD
[q(x)] .
Our goal is to design an oracle O that answers statistical queries onD using only iid samples
x1, . . . ,xn←R D. Our focus is the case where the queries are chosen adaptively and adversarially.
Specifically, O is a stateful algorithm that holds a collection of samples x1, . . . ,xn ∈ {0,1}d ,
takes a statistical query q as input, and returns a real-valued answer a ∈ [−1,1]. We require
that when x1, . . . ,xn are iid samples from D, the answer a is close to q(D), and moreover that
this condition holds for every query in an adaptively chosen sequence q1, . . . , q`. Formally, we
define the following game between an O and a stateful adversary A.
A chooses a distribution D over {0,1}d .
Sample x1, . . . ,xn←R D, let x = (x1, . . . ,xn).
For j = 1, . . . , `
A outputs a query qj .
O(x,qj ) outputs aj .
(As A and O are stateful, qj and aj may depend on the history q1, a1, . . . , qj−1, aj−1.)
Figure 3: Accn,d,`[O,A]
Definition 3.1 (Accuracy). An oracle O is (α,β,γ)-accurate for ` adaptively chosen queries given
n samples in {0,1}d if for every adversary A,
P
Accn,d,`[O,A]
[
For (1− β)` choices of j ∈ [`], ∣∣∣O(x,qj )− qj(D)∣∣∣ ≤ α] ≥ 1−γ .
As a shorthand, we will say that O is (α,β)-accurate for ` queries if for every n,d ∈ N, O is
(α,β,on(1))-accurate for ` queries given n samples in {0,1}d . Here, ` may depend on n and d
and on(1) is a function of n that tends to 0.
We are interested in oracles that are both accurate and computationally efficient. We say
that an oracle O is computationally efficient if, when given samples x1, . . . ,xn ∈ {0,1}d and a
query q : {0,1}d → [−1,1], it runs in time poly(n,d, |q|). Here q will be represented as a circuit
that evaluates q(x) and |q| denotes the size of this circuit.
3.2 Encryption Schemes
Our attack relies on the existence of a semantically secure private-key encryption scheme. An
encryption scheme is a triple of efficient algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) with the following syntax:
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• Gen is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a
λ-bit secret key. Formally, sk←R Gen(1λ).
• Enc is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a secret key and a messagem ∈ {−1,0,1}
and outputs a ciphertext ct ∈ {0,1}poly(λ). Formally, ct←R Enc(sk,m).
• Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a secret key and a ciphertext ct and
outputs a decrypted message m′. If the ciphertext ct was an encryption of m under the
key sk, then m′ =m. Formally, if ct←R Enc(sk,m), then Dec(sk,ct) =m with probability 1.
Roughly, security of the encryption scheme asserts that no polynomial time adversary who
does not know the secret key can distinguish encryptions of m = 0 from encryptions of m =
1, even if the adversary has access to an oracle that returns the encryption of an arbitrary
message under the unknown key. For convenience, we will require that this security property
holds simultaneously for an arbitrary polynomial number of secret keys. The existence of
an encryption scheme with this property follows immediately from the existence an ordinary
semantically secure encryption scheme. We start with the stronger definition only to simplify
our proofs. A secure encryption scheme exists under the minimal cryptographic assumption
that one-way functions exist. The formal definition of security is not needed until Section A.
3.3 The Attack
The adversary is specified in Figure 4. Observe that Attackn,d is only well defined for pairs
n,d ∈N for which 1+dlog2(2000n)e ≤ d, so that there exists a suitable choice of λ ∈N. Through
this section we will assume that n = n(d) is a polynomial in d and that d is a sufficiently large
unspecified constant, which ensures that Attackn,d is well defined.
3.4 Informal Analysis of the Attack
Before formally analysing the attack, we comment on the overall structure thereof.
At a high level, the attack Attackn,d[O] runs the fingerprinting game IFPCN,n,`[P ,F ], where
the oracle O plays the roˆle of the fingerprinting adversary P . Each challenge cj issued by F is
passed to the oracle in encrypted form as qj . The oracle must output an approximation aj to
the true answer
qj(D) = 1
N
∑
i∈[N ]\T j
c
j
i .
In order to do this, the oracle could decrypt qj to obtain cj for every j. However, the oracle
does not have all the necessary secret keys; it only has the secret keys corresponding to its
sample S. Thus, by the security of the encryption scheme, any efficient oracle effectively can
only see cj
S\T j . That is to say, if the oracle is computationally efficient, then it has the same
restriction as a fingerprinting adversary P . Thus, any computationally efficient oracle must lose
the fingerprinting game, meaning it cannot answer every query (or even just a β = 1/2 +Ω(1)
fraction of the queries) accurately.
One subtly arises since “accuracy” for the oracle is defined with respect to the true answer
qj(D) = 1N
∑
i∈[N ]\T j c
j
i , whereas “accuracy” in the fingerprinting game is defined with respect
to the average over all of cj , that is 1N
∑
i∈[N ] c
j
i . We deal with these subtleties by arguing that
T j , which is the number of users accused by the interactive fingerprinting code prior to the
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The distribution D:
Given parameters d,n, let N = 2000n, let λ = d − dlog2(N )e.
Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme
For i ∈ [N ], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski) ∈ {0,1}d .
Let D be the uniform distribution over {y1, . . . , yN } ⊆ {0,1}d .
O samples x1, . . . ,xn←R D. Let x = (x1, . . . ,xn).
Let S ⊆ [N ] be the set of unique indices i such that (i, ski) appears in x.
Attack:
Initialise a n-collusion resilient interactive fingerprinting code F of length ` for N
users robust to a β fraction of errors with failure probability ε = negl(n) and false accu-
sation probability δ = 1/1000.
Let T 1 = ∅.
For j = 1, . . . , ` = `(N ):
Let cj ∈ {±1}N be the column given by F .
For i = 1, . . . ,N , let ctji = Enc(ski , c
j
i ).
Define the query qj(i′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , ctji′ ) if i′ < T j and 0 otherwise.
Let aj = O(x;qj ) and round aj to {±1} to obtain aj .
Give aj to F and let I j ⊆ [N ] be the set of accused users and T j = T j−1 ∪ I j .
Figure 4: Attackn,d[O]
j-th query, is small. Here we use the fact that the fingerprinting code only allows a relatively
small number of false accusations N/1000. Therefore |T j | ≤ n+N/1000 ≤ N/500. As a result,
the definition of accuracy guaranteed by the oracle will be close enough to the definition of
accuracy required for the interactive fingerprinting code to succeed in identifying the sample.
3.5 Analysis of the Attack
In this section we prove our main result:
Theorem 3.2 (Theorem 1.1). Assuming one-way functions exist, for all β < 1/2, there is a func-
tion `(2000n,β) = O(n2/
(
1
2 − β
)4
) such that there is no computationally efficient oracle O that is
(0.99,β,1/2)-accurate for `(2000n,β) adaptively chosen queries given n samples in {0,1}d .
We will start by establishing that the number of falsely accused users is small. That is, we
have |T ` \ S | ≤ N/1000 with high probability. This condition will follow from the security of
the interactive fingerprinting code F . However, security alone is not enough to guarantee that
the number of falsely accused users is small, because security of F applies to adversaries that
only have access to cji for users i ∈ S \ T j , whereas the queries to the oracle depend on cji for
users i < S \ T j . To remedy this problem we rely on the fact entries cji for i outside of S \ T j are
encrypted under keys ski that are not known to the oracle. Thus, a computationally efficient
oracle “does not know” those rows. We can formalize this argument by comparing Attack to an
IdealAttack (Figure 5) where these entries are replaced with zeros, and argue that the adversary
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cannot distinguish between these two attacks without breaking the security of the encryption
scheme.
The distribution D:
Given parameters d,n, let N = 2000n, and λ = d − dlog2(N )e.
Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme
For i ∈ [N ], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski) ∈ {0,1}d .
Let D be the uniform distribution over {y1, . . . , yN } ⊆ {0,1}d .
Choose samples x1, . . . ,xn←R D, let x = (x1, . . . ,xn).
Let S ⊆ [N ] be the set of unique indices i such that (i, ski) appears in x.
Recovery phase:
Initialise a n-collusion resilient interactive fingerprinting code F of length ` for N
users robust to a β fraction of errors with failure probability ε = negl(n) and false accu-
sation probability δ = 1/1000.
Let T 1 = ∅.
For j = 1, . . . , ` = `(N ):
Let cj ∈ {±1}N be the column given by F .
For i ∈ S, let ctji = Enc(ski , cji ), for i ∈ [N ] \ S, let ctji = Enc(ski ,0).
Define the query qj(i′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , ctji′ ) if i′ < T j and 0 otherwise.
Let aj = O(x;qj ) and round aj to {±1} to obtain aj .
Give aj to F and let I j ⊆ [N ] be the set of accused users and T j = T j−1 ∪ I j .
Figure 5: IdealAttackn,d[O]
Claim 3.3. For every oracle O, every polynomial n = n(d), and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
P
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
|T ` \ S | > N/1000
]
≤ negl(n)
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from a reduction to the security of the fingerprinting
code. Notice that the query qj does not depend on any entry cji for i < S \ T j−1. Thus, an
adversary for the fingerprinting code who has access to cj
S\T j−1 can simulate the view of the
oracle. Since we have for any adversary P
P
IFPCN,n,`[P ,F ]
[
ψ` > (N −n)δ
]
≤ ε,
we also have
P
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
|T ` \ S | > N/1000
]
≤ negl(n),
as desired.
Now we can argue that an efficient oracle cannot distinguish between the real attack and
the ideal attack. Thus the conclusion that |T ` \ S | ≤ N/1000 with high probability must also
hold in the real game.
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Claim 3.4. Let Z1 be the event
{
|T ` \ S | > N/1000
}
. Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally
secure encryption scheme and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then, if O is computationally efficient,
for every sufficiently large d ∈N∣∣∣∣∣∣ PIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z1]− PAttackn,d [O] [Z1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
The proof is straightforward from the definition of security, and is deferred to Section A.
Combining Claims 3.3 and 3.4 we easily obtain the following.
Claim 3.5. For every computionally efficient oracle O, every polynomial n = n(d), and every suffi-
ciently large d ∈N,
P
Attackn,d [O]
[
|T ` \ S | > N/1000
]
≤ negl(n)
Claim 3.5 will be useful because it will allow us to establish that an accurate oracle must
give answers that are consistent with the fingerprinting code. That is, using θ` to denote the
number of inconsistent answers a1, . . . , a`, we will have θ`  `/2 with high probability.
Claim 3.6. If O is (0.99,β,1/2)-accurate for ` = `(2000n) adaptively chosen queries then, for every
polynomial n = n(d) and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
P
Attackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ β`
]
≥ 1/2−negl(n)
Proof. In the attack, the oracle’s input consists of n samples from D, and the total number of
queries issued is `. Therefore, by the assumption that O is (0.99,β,1/2)-accurate for ` queries,
we have
P

For (1− β)` choices of j ∈ [`],∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qj )− E(i,ski )←RD [qj(i, ski)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.99
 ≥ 1/2. (9)
Observe that, by construction, for every j ∈ [`],∣∣∣∣∣∣ E(i,ski )←RD [qj(i, ski)]− Ei∈[N ]
[
c
j
i
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 1N ∑
i∈[N ]\T j−1
Dec(ski , ct
j
i ) +
1
N
∑
i∈T j−1
0
− Ei∈[N ]
[
c
j
i
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 1N ∑
i∈[N ]\T j−1
c
j
i
− 1N ∑
i∈[N ]
c
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣− 1N ∑
i∈T j−1
c
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣T j−1∣∣∣
N
≤|T
j−1 \ S |+ |S |
N
(10)
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where the second equality is because by construction ctji ←R Enc(ski , cji ) and the inequality is
because we have cji ∈ {±1}.
By Claim 3.5, and the fact that T j−1 ⊆ T `, we have
P
[
|T j−1 \ S | > N/1000
]
≤ negl(n).
Noting that N/1000 +n < N/500 and combining with (10), we have
P
[
∀ j ∈ [`],
∣∣∣∣∣∣ E(i,ski )←RD [qj(i, ski)]− Ei∈[n]
[
c
j
i
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/500
]
≥ 1−negl(n) (11)
Applying the triangle inequality to (9) and (11), we obtain
P

For (1− β)` choices of j ∈ [`],∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qj )− Ei∈[N ]
[
c
j
i
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.99 + 1/500
 ≥ 1/2−negl(n). (12)
Fix a j ∈ [`] such that aj is 0.99-accurate for query qj . If cji = 1 for every i ∈ [N ], then
aj = O(x,qj ) ≥ 1 − 0.99 − 1/500, so the rounded answer aj = 1. Similarly if cji = −1 for every
i ∈ [N ], aj = −1. Therefore there must exist i ∈ [N ] so that aj = cji . Thus there are (1 − β)`
choices of j ∈ [`] for which this condition holds, so the number of errors θ` is at most β`. This
completes the proof of the claim.
As before, we can argue that the real attack and the ideal attack are computationally indis-
tinguishable, and thus the oracle must also give consistent answers in the ideal attack.
Claim 3.7. Let Z2 be the event
{
θ` ≤ β`
}
. Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure en-
cryption scheme and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computationally efficient, for every
d ∈N ∣∣∣∣∣∣ PIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z2]− PAttackn,d [O] [Z2]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
The proof is straightforward from the definition of security, and is deferred to Section A.
Combining Claims 3.6 and 3.7 we easily obtain the following.
Claim 3.8. If O computationally efficient and (0.99,β,1/2)-accurate for ` = `(2000n) adaptively
chosen queries then for every polynomial n = n(d) and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
P
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ β`
]
≥ 1/2−negl(n).
However, the conclusion of 3.8 can easily be seen to lead to a contradiction, because the
security of the fingerprinting code assures that no attacker who only has access to cj
S\T j−1 in
each round j = 1, . . . , ` can give answers that are consistent for (1− β)` of the columns cj . Thus,
we have
Claim 3.9. For every oracle O, every polynomial n = n(d), and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
P
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ β`
]
≤ negl(n)
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Putting the above claims together, we obtain the main theorem:
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there were such an oracle. The-
orem 2.2 implies that an interactive fingerprinting code of length O(n2/
(
1
2 − β
)4
) exists, so the
attack can be carried out. By Claim 3.8 we would have
P
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ β`
]
≥ 1/2−negl(n).
But, by Claim 3.9 we have
P
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ β`
]
≤ negl(n),
which is a contradiction.
Note that the constants in the (0.99,β,1/2)-accuracy assumption are arbitrary and have only
been fixed for simplicity.
3.6 An Information-Theoretic Lower Bound
As in [HU14], we observe that the techniques underlying our computational hardness result
can also be used to prove an information-theoretic lower bound when the dimension of the
data is large. At a high level, the argument uses the fact that the encryption scheme we rely on
only needs to satisfy relatively weak security properties, specifically security for at most O(n2)
messages. This security property can actually be achieved against computationally unbounded
adversaries provided that the length of the secret keys is O(n2). As a result, our lower bound
can be made to hold against computationally unbounded oracles, but since the secret keys
have length O(n2), we will require d =O(n2). We refer the reader to [HU14] for a slightly more
detailed discussion, and simply state the following result.
Theorem 3.10 (Theorem 1.2). For all β < 1/2, there is a function `(2000n,β) = O(n2/
(
1
2 − β
)4
)
such that there is no oracle O (even one that is computationally unbounded) that is (0.99,β,1/2)-
accurate for `(2000n,β) adaptively chosen queries given n samples in {0,1}d when d ≥ `(2000n,β).
4 Hardness of Avoiding Blatant Non Privacy
In this section we show how our arguments also imply that computationally efficient oracles
that guarantee accuracy for adaptively chosen statistical queries must be blatantly non-private.
4.1 Blatant Non Privacy and Sample Accuracy
Before we can define blatant non-privacy, we need to define a notion of accuracy that is more
appropriate for the application to privacy. In contrast to Definition 3.1 where accuracy is de-
fined with respect to the distribution, here we define accurate with respect to the sample itself.
With this change in mind, we model blatant non-privacy via the following game.
Definition 4.1. An oracle O is (α,β,γ)-sample-accurate for ` adaptively chosen queries given n
samples in {0,1}d if for every adversary Apriv,
P
NonPrivacyn,d,`[O,Apriv]
[
For (1− β)` choices of j ∈ [`], ∣∣∣O(x,qj )− qj(x)∣∣∣ ≤ α] ≥ 1−γ
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Apriv chooses a set y = {y1, . . . , y2n} ⊆ {0,1}d
Sample a random subsample x ⊆R y of size n
For j = 1, . . . , `
Apriv outputs a query qj
O(x,qj ) outputs aj
(As Apriv and O are stateful, qj and aj may depend on q1, a1, . . . , qj−1, aj−1.)
Apriv outputs a set x′ ⊆ y
Figure 6: NonPrivacyn,d[O,Apriv]
where q(x) = 1n
∑
i∈[n] q(xi) is the average over the sample.
As a shorthand, we will say that O is (α,β)-sample-accurate for ` queries if for every n,d ∈N,
O is (α,β,on(1))-accurate for ` queries given n samples in {0,1}d . Here, ` may depend on n and
d and on(1) is a function of n that tends to 0.
Definition 4.2. An oracle O is blatantly non-private if there exists an adversary Apriv such that
P
NonPrivacyn,d,`[O,Apriv]
[|x4x′ | > n/100] ≤ on(1)
4.2 Lower Bounds
In this section we show the following theorem
Theorem 4.3. Assuming one-way functions exist, any computationally efficient oracle O that gives
accurate answers to O(n2) adaptively chosen queries is blatantly non-private.
The attack is defined in Figure 7. Therein F is a n-collusion-resilient interactive finger-
printing code of length ` for N = 2n users robust to a β fraction of errors with false accusation
probability δ = 1/20000. And (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure encryption scheme.
We will start by establishing that the number of falsely accused users is small. That is,
we have |T L \ x| ≤ n/10000 with high probability. As in Section 3, this condition will follow
from the security of the interactive fingerprinting code F combined with the security of the
encryption scheme, via the introduction of an “ideal attack” (Figure 8).
Claim 4.4. For every oracle O, every polynomial n = n(d), and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
P
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
|T L \ x| > n/10000
]
≤ negl(n)
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from a reduction to the security of the fingerprinting
code. Notice that since the query qj does not depend on any entry cji for i < x \ T j−1. Thus,
an adversary for the fingerprinting code who has access to cj
x\T j−1 can simulate the view of the
oracle. Since we have for any adversary P
P
IFPCN,n,`[P ,F ]
[
ψ` > N/20000
]
≤ negl(n),
we also have
P
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
|T L \ x| > n/10000
]
≤ negl(n),
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The set y:
Given parameters d,n, let λ = d − dlog2(2n)e.
For i ∈ [2n], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski).
Attack:
Let T 1 = ∅.
For j = 1, . . . , ` = `(2n):
Let cj ∈ {±1}2n be the column given by F .
For i = 1, . . . ,2n, let ctji = Enc(ski , c
j
i ).
Define the query qj(i′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , ctji′ ) if i′ < T j and 0 otherwise.
Let aj = O(x;qj ) and round (n/(n− |T j−1|))aj to {±1} to obtain aj .
Give aj to F and let I j ⊆ [N ] be the set of accused users and T j = T j−1 ∪ I j .
If |T j | > 499n/500, let L = j, halt, and output x′ = {yi : i ∈ T L}.
Let L = `, and output x′ = {yi : i ∈ T L}.
Figure 7: PrivacyAttackn,d[O]
where we have used the fact that |T L \ x| = ψL ≤ ψ`. This completes the proof.
Now we can argue that an efficient oracle cannot distinguish between the real attack and
the ideal attack. Thus the conclusion that |T L \ x| ≤ n/10000 with high probability must also
hold in the real game.
Claim 4.5. Let Z1 be the event
{
|T L \ x| > n/10000
}
. Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally
secure encryption scheme and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computationally efficient,
for every d ∈N ∣∣∣∣∣∣ PIdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O] [Z1]− PPrivacyAttackn,d [O] [Z1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
The proof is straightforward from the definition of security, and is deferred to Section A.
Combining Claims 4.4 and 4.5 we easily obtain the following.
Claim 4.6. For every computionally efficient oracle O, every polynomial n = n(d), and every suffi-
ciently large d ∈N,
P
PrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
|T L \ x| > n/10000
]
≤ negl(n)
By Claim 4.6 we have |x′ \ x| ≤ n/10000. Now, in order to show |x′4x| ≤ n/100, it suffices to
show that |x\x′ | ≤ n/200. In order to do so we begin with the following claim, which establishes
that if the oracle O is sufficiently accurate, and |x \ T j−1| ≤ n/200, then the oracle returns a
consistent answer to the query qj . Recalling that we use θj to denote the number of rounded
answers ak for 1 ≤ k ≤ j that are inconsistent with cj , we can state the following claim.
Claim 4.7. If O is (1/1000,β,1/2)-sample-accurate for ` = `(2n,β) adaptively chosen queries then
for every polynomial n = n(d), every sufficiently large d ∈N,
P
PrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
θL ≤ βL
]
≥ 1/2.
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The set y:
Given parameters d,n, let λ = d − dlog2(2n)e.
For i ∈ [2n], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski).
Attack:
Let T 1 = ∅.
For j = 1, . . . , ` = `(2n):
Let cj ∈ {±1}2n be the column given by F .
For i = 1, . . . ,2n, let ctji = Enc(ski , c
j
i ).
For i ∈ S, let ctji = Enc(ski , cji ), for i ∈ [N ] \ x, let ctji = Enc(ski ,0).
Let aj = O(x;qj ) and round (n/(n− |T j−1|))aj to {±1} to obtain aj .
Give aj to F and let I j ⊆ [N ] be the set of accused users and T j = T j−1 ∪ I j .
If |T j | > 499n/500, let L = j, halt, and output x′ = {yi : i ∈ T L}.
Let L = `, and output x′ = {yi : i ∈ T L}.
Figure 8: IdealPrivacyAttackn,d[O]
Proof. Observe that, by construction, for every j ∈ [`],
E
xi∈x
[
qj(xi)
]
=
1
n
 ∑
i∈(x\T j−1)
c
j
i +
∑
i∈(x∩T j−1)
0

= E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]
·
( |x \ T j−1|
n
)
After renormalizing by (n/n− |T j−1|) we have(
n
n− |T j−1|
)
· E
i∈x
[
qj(xi)
]
= E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]
·
(
n
n− |T j−1|
)
·
( |x \ T j−1|
n
)
= E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]
·
(
n− |T j−1|+ |T j−1 \ x|
n− |T j−1|
)
= E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]
·
(
1 +
|T j−1 \ x|
n− |T j−1|
)
Since 0 ≤ |T j−1 \x| ≤ n/10000 (by Claim 4.6), and since the algorithm terminates unless |T j−1| ≤
499n/500, we obtain
E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]
≤
(
n
n− |T j−1|
)
· E
i∈x
[
qj(xi)
]
≤ 21
20
· E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]
=⇒
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
n
n− |T j−1|
)
· E
i∈x
[
qj(xi)
]
− E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 120 (13)
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By the assumption that O is (1/1000,β,1/2)-sample-accurate, we have that, with probability at
least 1/2, for (1− β)L choices of j ∈ [L],∣∣∣∣∣aj − Ei∈x [qj(xi)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/1000. (14)
Now, combining (13) and (14), we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
n
n− |T j−1|
)
· aj − E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
n
n− |T j−1|
)
· E
i∈x
[
qj(xi)
]
− E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ nn− |T j−1| · 11000
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 120 + 12 ≤ 23 (15)
for (1− β)L choices of j ∈ [L].
Finally, observe that if cji = 1 for every i ∈ [2n], then we have
E
i∈(x\T j−1)
[
c
j
i
]
= 1,
and by (15) we have (n/(n− |T j |))aj ≥ 1− 2/3 = 1/3. Thus, the rounded answer aj = 1. Similarly,
if cji = −1 for every i ∈ [2n], then we have aj = −1. This completes the proof of the claim.
As before, we can argue that the real attack and the ideal attack are computationally indis-
tinguishable, and thus the oracle must also give consistent answers in the ideal attack.
Claim 4.8. Let Z2 be the event
{
θL ≤ βL
}
. Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure en-
cryption scheme and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computationally efficient, for every
d ∈N ∣∣∣∣∣∣ PIdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O] [Z2]− PPrivacyAttackn,d [O] [Z2]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
The proof is straightforward from the definition of security, and is deferred to Section A.
Combining Claims 4.7 and 4.8 we easily obtain the following.
Claim 4.9. If O iscomputationally efficient and (1/1000,β,1/2)-accurate for ` = `(2n,β) adaptively
chosen queries then for every polynomial n = n(d) and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
P
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
θL ≤ βL
]
≥ 1/2−negl(n).
We can use Claim 4.9 to derive a contradiction. To do so we use the fact that the security
of the fingerprinting code assures that no attacker who only has access to cj
x\T j−1 in each round
j = 1, . . . , ` can give answers that are consistent for all ` of the columns cj . Thus, we have
Claim 4.10. For every oracle O, every polynomial n = n(d), and every sufficiently large d ∈ N, if
L = `
P
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ β`
]
≤ negl(n)
Putting it together, we obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.11. Assuming one-way functions exist, for every β < 1/2, there is a function `(2n,β) =
O(n2/
(
1
2 − β
)4
) such that there is no computationally efficient oracle O that is (1/1000,β,1/2)-
accurate for `(2n) adaptively chosen queries given n samples in {0,1}d .
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there were such an oracle. Now consider two
cases. First consider the case that L < `, which means the algorithm has terminated early due
to the condition |T L| ≥ 499n/500 being reached. In this case we have |x′ | = |T L| ≥ 499n/500.
However, by Claim 4.4, we have that |x′ \ x| ≤ n/10000. Therefore we have
|x4x′ | = |x| − |x′ |+ 2|x′ \ x| ≤ n
500
+
2n
10000
≤ n
200
,
as desired.
Now consider the case where L = `, meaning the algorithm does not terminate early. In this
case, by Claim 4.9 we have
P
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ βL
]
≥ 1/2−negl(n),
but by Claim 4.10 we have
P
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
θ` ≤ βL
]
≤ negl(n),
which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the theorem.
4.3 An Information-Theoretic Lower Bound
As we did in Section 3.6, we can prove an information-theoretic analogue of our hardness result
for avoiding blatant non-privacy.
Theorem 4.12. There is a function `(2n,β) = O(n2/
(
1
2 − β
)4
) such that there is no oracle O (even
a computationally unbounded one) that is (1/1000,β,1/2)-accurate for `(2n,β) adaptively chosen
queries given n samples in {0,1}d where d ≥ `(2n,β).
The proof is essentially identical to what is sketched in Section 3.6.
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A Security Reductions from Sections 3 and 4
In Section 3 we made several claims comparing the probability of events in Attack to the prob-
ability of events in IdealAttack. Each of these claims follow from the assumed security of the
encryption scheme. In this section we restate and prove these claims. Since the claims are
all of a similar nature, the proof will be somewhat modular. The claims in Section 4 relating
PrivacyAttack to IdealPrivacyAttack can be proven in an essentially identical fashion, and we
omit these proofs for brevity.
Before we begin recall the formal definition of security of an encryption scheme. Security
is defined via a pair of oracles E0 and E1. E1(sk1, . . . , skN , ·) takes as input the index of a key
i ∈ [N ] and a message m and returns Enc(ski ,m), whereas E0(sk1, . . . , skN , ·) takes the same input
but returns Enc(ski ,0). The security of the encryption scheme asserts that for randomly chosen
secret keys, no computationally efficient adversary can tell whether or not it is interacting with
E0 or E1.
Definition A.1. An encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) is secure if for every polynomial N =
N (λ), and every poly(λ)-time adversary B, if sk1, . . . , skN ←R Gen(1λ)∣∣∣∣P [BE0(sk1,...,skN ,·) = 1]−P [BE1(sk1,...,skN ,·) = 1]∣∣∣∣ = negl(λ)
We now restate the relevant claims from Section 3.
Claim A.2 (Claim 3.4 Restated). Let Z1 be the event
{
ψ` > N/8
}
. Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a com-
putationally secure encryption scheme and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computa-
tionally efficient, for every d ∈N∣∣∣∣∣∣ PIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z1]− PAttackn,d [O] [Z1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
Claim A.3 (Claim 3.7 Restated). Let Z2 be the event
{
θ` ≤ β`
}
. Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a compu-
tationally secure encryption scheme and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then ifO is computationally
efficient, for every d ∈N ∣∣∣∣∣∣ PIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z2]− PAttackn,d [O] [Z2]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
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To prove both of these claims, for c ∈ {1,2} we construct an adversary Bc that will attempt
to use O to break the security of the encryption. We construct Bc in such a way that its advan-
tage in breaking the security of encryption is precisely the difference in the probability of the
event Zc between Attack and IdealAttack, which implies that the difference in probabilities is
negligible. The simulator is given in Figure 9
Simulate constructing and sampling from D:
Given parameters d,n, let N = 2000n, let λ = d − dlog2(2000n)e.
Sample users u1, . . . ,un←R [N ], let S be the set of distinct users in the sample.
Choose new keys ski ←R Gen(1λ) for i ∈ S.
For i ∈ S, let xi = (ui , skui ), let x = (x1, . . . ,xn).
Simulate the attack:
Let T 1 = ∅.
For j = 1, . . . , ` = `(N ):
Let cj be the column given by F .
For i = 1, . . . ,N :
If i ∈ S, let ctji = Enc(ski , cji ), otherwise as E for an encryption of cji under
key ski , that is ct
j
i = Eb(sk1, . . . , skN , i, cji ).
Define the query qj(i′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , ctji′ ) if i′ < T j and 0 otherwise.
Let aj = O(x;qj ) and round aj to {±1} to obtain aj .
Give aj to F and let I j ⊆ [N ] be the set of accused users and T j = T j−1 ∪ I j .
Output 1 if and only if the event Zc occurs
Figure 9: BEb(sk1,...,skN ,·)c,n,d
Proof of Claims A.2, A.3. First, observe that for c ∈ {1,2}, Bc is computationally efficient as long
as F and O are both computationally efficient. It is not hard to see that our construction F is
efficient and efficiency ofO is an assumption of the claim. Also notice B can determine whether
Zc has occurred efficiently.
Now we observe that when the oracle is E1 (the oracle that takes as input i andm and returns
Enc(ski ,m)), and sk1, . . . , skN are chosen randomly from Gen(1λ), then the view of the oracle is
identical to Attackn,d[O]. Specifically, the oracle holds a random sample of pairs (i, ski) and
is shown queries that are encryptions either under keys it knows or random unknown keys.
Moreover, the messages being encrypted are chosen from the same distribution. On the other
hand, when the oracle is E0 (the oracle that takes as input i and ct and returns Enc(ski ,0)), then
the view of the oracle is identical to Attackn,d[O]. Thus we have that for c ∈ {1,2},∣∣∣∣∣∣ PIdealAttackn,d [O] [Zc]− PAttackn,d [O] [Zc]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Psk1,...,skN←RGen(1λ)
[
BE0(sk1,...,skN ,·)c,n,d = 1
]
− P
sk1,...,skN←RGen(1λ)
[
BE1(sk1,...,skN ,·)c,n,d = 1
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ = negl(λ) = negl(d)
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The last equality holds because we have chosen N = 2000n(d) = poly(d), and therefore we have
λ = d − dlogN e = d −O(logd). This completes the proof of both claims.
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